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As a result of the legislation of 1855, 1856 and 1862, limited liability gained great
popularity in the United Kingdom over the mid- 1860s, involving not only the
establishment of new companies but also the conversion of established private firms
into limited companies.i However, economic historians usually point to the collapse
of Overend, Gurney & Co. Ltd in 1866 as an equally significant landmark in this
development, representing a complete reversal of their popularity if only cyclically.3
Even if the collapse of this important company, as a result ofa fraudulent prospectus,
was not solely responsible, it marked a temporary pause in the explosion of founding
new limited companies." It also brought about a reversal, albeit temporary, in
public opinion towards them, resulting in a belief that potential investors were
1 The authors would like to thank HSBC plc and the Girl Guides Association for their help concerning
various documents in their possession. They would also like to thank Judith Wale, Brian Turner,
Phil Cottrell and the anonymous referee tor their helpful comments and suggestions on earlier
versions of this paper.
2 B. C. Hunt, The Developmentof the Business Corporation in England 1800-1867 (Cambridge, MA, 1936:
repr. New York, 19(9). He writes: 'By 1865, the Times (19 May 18(5) was sufficiently impressed to
exclaim that the whole country, if not the world, was growing every day into "one vast mass of
impersonalities" (pp. 145-6).
3 P. W. Ireland, 'The rise of the limited liability company'. International [outna! oi the Socioloyv 0(LIlP,
i z (1984): H. A. Shannon, 'The first five thousand limited companies'. Economic History Rep/ell'. 3
(1931); Idem, 'The limited companies of 1866-1883', Economic History Review, 4 (1933): and Hunt,
Development of the Business Corporation.
4 Shannon, 'Limited companies of 1866-1883', found that between 1844 and 1856966 companies
were registered, between 1856 and 1862 nearly 2,500 and between 1863 and 1866 3,500 (of which
900 offered shares to the general public). However, during 1867-69 there were only 799 formations.
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inadequately safeguarded as a result, usually, of being provided with both
insufficient and deficient financial information, particularly by prospectuses that
were unregulated and frequently misleading or uninformative." Trust was broken:
businessmen and investors were dubious of one another, and many entrepreneurs,
who had previously welcomed the formation of limited liability companies,
avoided them."
Not only was the number of promotions high prior to the Overend, Gurney &
Co. Ltd collapse but so too was the number of failures. In a statistical analysis of
7,000 companies formed between 1844 and 1868, Hunt estimated that only 2,900
were still in business in 1868. 7 He largely attributed this outcome to the high
proportion of fraud, with many new companies having been established simply to
enrich their promoters and accomplices. Subsequent statistical analysis by Shannon"
reached a similar conclusion over the high percentage of insolvencies amongst
companies, particularly during the first five years after their incorporation (17 per
cent during the period 1866-83). But he also pointed to another reason: the large
number of abortive company formations that proceeded no further than the regis-
tration of a memorandum of association. Y Shannon remarks that 'we may say that in
the first quarter century or so of limited liability the investor rejected more or less
out of hand about one-third of the proposals submitted to him'. As to those
companies that were founded and then failed, according to Shannon, they 'tailed
from fraud or gross mismanagement amounting to fraud'. However, the view of Sir
John Clapham was quite different - that the large number of insolvencies was
largely attributable to 'misfortune or mismanagement not necessarily amounting
to fraud'. 10
This paper examines some case study evidence concerning the issues surrounding
the promotion of new joint-stock companies during the mid- I 860s and the influ-
ence of financial information. It is not possible to tell from aggregate statistical
studies alone whether, and to what extent, incompetence, or unprofitable specu-
lation or fraud contributed to company failure. The different interpretations drawn
Hunt, Deveiopment of the Business Corporation, wrote that: 'Limited liability suddenly became
extremely unpopular; it had "palpably and plainly intensified a panic"; indeed many were disposed
to father on it all the disasters that had occurred. A universal outcry against all joint-stock companies
broke forth. The country was discouraged and suspicious, the House of Commons almost hostile'
(p. 154)·
6 G. Robb, VVllite Collar Crime in Modem England: Financial Fraud and Business Morality, 1845-1929
(Cambridge, 1992), p. 187.
7 Hunt, Developmentof the Business Corporation, p. 157.
8 Shannon, 'Limited companies of 1866-1883'.
9 From 1856, companies were incorporated merely by filing a memorandum of association, signed by
a minimum of 7 people, stating the company name, its objects and its nominal share capital. If they
made no substantive subsequent returns, they were regarded by the Registrar as abortive. See
Shannon. 'The first five thousand limited companies'.
10 Sir J. H. Clapham, An Economic History of Modem Britain, 1lI, Machines and National Rivalries
(1887-1914) with all Epilogue (1914-1929) (Cambridge, repr. (951), p. 202.
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from the same data by Shannon and Clapham illustrate this. It is also not possible to
tell whether they were mutually exclusive (as Shannon's and Clapham's conclusions
imply), whether they were combined, or whether they were interrelated in some
other way. For example, some modern frauds have occurred as a result of business
failure when the directors of the companies involved recognised it was inevitable. 11
Contributing to the vulnerability of Victorian businessmen and investors was,
according to Robb, 'the primitive nature of accountancy and auditing (which) made
fraud difficult to discover' .12 Not only were the principles of accounting still being
established for these new types of business, there was also very little understanding as
to how they should be applied and there was certainly no consistency or uniformity in
their application. lJ Furthermore, as a result of the increased need for accountants'
services (to a large part attributable to a rise in bankruptcy work), individuals with little
or no training were setting up in practice as accountants and auditors. 14 According to
Littleton, most audits were simply 'Inadequate and amateurish ... consisting even in
1875 of ascertaining that some sort of voucher could be produced for every payment
and the printed balance sheet corresponded with the balances in the ledger'. 15
Irrespective of accountants' and auditors' abilities to portray business reality in
their accounts, the creation of their profession and the first efforts at profit measure-
ment are attributed to the efforts to resolve these problerns.l'' The first attempt at
establishing professional bodies in England occurred in 1870, somewhat later than
in Scotland.l ' Professional certification both enhanced the credibility of those who
achieved it, and helped to raise professional standards. Studies of contemporary
writings (notably in The Accountant which began publication in 1874) attribute
improvements in bookkeeping and auditing skills to this professionalisation.l"
11 As in the recent case ofRobert Maxwell.
12 Robb, White CollarCrime, p. 18!.
13 See R. P. Brief, 'The origin and evolution of nineteenth-century asset accounting', BusinessHistory
Review (1906); and R. A. Bryer, 'The late nineteenth-century revolution in financial reporting:
accounting for the rise of investor or managerial capitalism?', Accollnting, O~Ranisations and Society,
18 (1993).
14 It has recently been shown by R. A. Chandler, J. R. Edwards and M. Anderson in 'Changing
perceptions of the role of the company auditor, 1840- I940" Accounting and Business Research, 23
(1993), that the primary audit objective was then financial statement verification and not, as was
previously thought, fraud detection.
15 A. C. Littleton, Accounting Evolution to 1900 (New York, 1933; repr. 19(6), p. 290. Robb, White
Collar Crime, cites a similar, but more caustic, description - Charles Dickens's famous diatribe
against the 'wooden guardians of property'. Dickens described auditors as 'composed of a little
fussiness, a great deal of carelessness and trusting simplicity ... an almost superstitious reverence for
figures, if they appeared to balance each other, and showed no mark of erasure; and that so long as
these emblems or signs of things were provided in liberal quantities, it (the auditor) never cared to
inquire whether the things themselves had any substantial existence' (p. 202).
16 See Littleton, Accounting Evolution; and Bryer, 'Financial reporting'.
17 These were in Liverpool and London, closely followed by Manchester in I87!. See Littleton,
Accounting Evolution, p. 316.
18 These initiatives culminated in the formation of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in 1880
from the local societies, with admission by examination only from 1882. See ibid., p. 3 [6.
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Case studies are probably the best means of examining the role of financial
information with regard to both the initial formation and promotion of a new
limited liability company and the subsequent financial decisions affecting it. The
business discussed here is particularly interesting because attempts were made to
establish it as a limited liability company both before and after the crash of Overend,
Gurney & Co. Ltd. Questions asked of this case are: was the prospectus misleading?
If so, was this intentional, and does this explain the failure of the prospectus? Was
the failure of Overend, Gurney & Co. Ltd responsible for both the unsuccessful
subsequent attempts to issue the company's shares and its eventual collapse?
Concerning the published accounting information, was it used to mislead potential
investors? Alternatively, was accountancy so 'primitive" that it was not open to
intentional manipulation? Finally, was the accounting information provided to
directors so 'primitive' as to be unreliable and, given the then lack of financial
expertise and experience of entrepreneurs, were they capable of using it?
The businesses considered are the Vale ofBelvoir plaster companies (subsequently
referred to as VoB), most of whose accounting records, business correspondence
and directors' minutes for the period 1864-71 have survived. At its peak, VoB not
only boasted of processing gypsum that was 'the finest in the kingdom' 19 but also of
owning the largest, most modern and most efficient 'manufactory' of gypsum
products in Europe.f" It has also been estimated that from 1868 to 1871 VoB
accounted for about 18 per cent of total British output of gypsum products and its
manufactory at Orston about 8 per cent.21 Although records survive for other
British companies formed around 1866, they were largely successful and continued
to trade into the twentieth century.v'
Underlying the spirit of optimism during the early 1860s was the recognition that
technological advances had produced opportunities of scale that could only be
obtained by forming much larger businesses. The greater amounts of capital that
this implied required the involvement, and support, of investors who, generally,
had limited or little understanding of the businesses they were financing.i"
19 Victoria History of the Counties ofEngland, A History of Nottinohnmshirc (London, Il)IO).
20 Nottinghamshire Archives Office [hereafter NAO]: DD.H 167/107: and The Ncwark: Advertiser
[hereafter NA] (2 Aug. 1865).
21 P. A. Barnes and R.J. Firman, 'Gypsum in the parish ofOrston, Nottinghamshire', Bulletin of the
Peak District Mines Historical Society, 11 (r991).
22 L. Richmond and B. Stockford, Company Archives: The Survey of the Records of 1000 of the First
Companies in England and Wales (Glasgow, 1986).
23 P. L. Cottrell, Industrial Finance 1830-1914: The Finance and OYJ;allisatimz of English Manufacturing
Industry (London, 1980), pp. 266-7.
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VoB was an early, probably the first, attempt to undertake large-scale production
in the gypsum and plaster industry of the United Kingdom. The idea for a company
dated from I864, when it was decided to extend an existing gypsum quarrying and
plaster manufacturing business in Newark-on-Trent, Nottinghamshire. The town
was one of the main centres for gypsum exploitation, then an important and
developing industry in the English East Midlands. Gypsum was mostly converted
into plaster of Paris that, according to its colour and purity, was used as the main
ingredient of a wide variety of wall, ceiling, pottery and other specialised plasters
and of patent cements. Raw, ground gypsum was also used in agriculture, and as a
filler and whitener (Mineral Alba). As with plaster of Paris, it was the whitest
products which commanded the highest prices, Newark being able to take advan-
tage of the high quality of its, albeit thin, gypsum seams. As the clay overlying the
gypsum was usually suitable for the production of bricks, tiles, land drains and other
similar ceramics, ancillary brick making was often combined with gypsum extrac-
tion despite problems arising from seasonal methods of digging and over-wintering
the clay. These clay-based products were sold locally, unlike the best quality plaster
of Paris that was exported to other parts of the country and around the world.
By I860, there were four smallish businesses involved in gypsum quarrying and
manufacturing plaster at Newark, mainly based on diggings on and around Beacon
Hill. 24 During the early I860s, the proprietor of probably the largest, William
Jacobs, decided to expand and build a large 'manufactory', near the village of Orston
about ten miles away. Gypsum had been dug there since the sixteenth century and
was considered to be of a very fine quality.25 The establishment of an integrated
enterprise probably dates from July I860, when the Royal Plaster Works were
operated by Messrs Willis and Co. of London. However, it failed in I 864,2(, but its
works were acquired by Jacobs. He was joined by James Carter, an auctioneer and
stock and share broker from Nottingham. They were to extend the business by
opening a large quarry and building new works on a grand scale on land, owned by
Carter, just outside the village. 27 The erection of these works began in I864 and
took about two years to complete.
In order to finance the new business, Carter and Jacobs decided to offer shares to
the public through a prospectus published on 9 August I 865. It invited applications
for 6,000 £5 shares in the Vale ofBel voir and Newark Plaster, Cement and Mineral
Co. Ltd (subsequently referred to as VoBNPCM), Newark's first limited liability
24 F. White & Co., History, Gazeteer and Directory ~f the Borouoh. ~f Derby and the Town and County of
Nottingham (Sheffield, 1861).
25 R. J. Pirman, 'Gypsum in Nottinghamshire', Bulletin C!.f the Peak District A1il1;I1.'<. Historical Society,
2 (1964).
26 F. White & Co., Directory o(Nottingham (1864).
27 It is not known why Carter, the owner of a successful firm of auctioneers. decided to embark on
gypsum and plaster manufacture requiring outside finance on such a scale. Presumably, it was
simply because of his ownership of the land at Orston, known to be rich in tine gypsum with access
to the railway line. and his interest in stocks and shares.
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cornpany.f" Each application was to be accompanied by an initial payment of £ I
per share, with a further £1 IOS [£1.50] to be subscribed when shares were allotted.
As was then usual, the remaining balance of the company's nominal capital was left
unpaid.:" The money raised would be used to purchase:
the Goodwill of the Business, and the Plaster of Paris and Cement Works, situate at Newark
upon Trent ... in the occupation of Mr W Jacobs and also for the purpose of purchasing
the Buildings, Steam Engines and Plant, and of Clay and other Materials, underlying the
Freehold and Leasehold Properties situate at Orston ... belonging to Messrs. Carter and
Jacobs and for the Manufacture and Sale of Plaster-of-Paris, Cement, Gypsum, Clay, and
other Mineral prcducts.:"
The prospectus pointed to how the Newark works had been successfully run by
Jacobs, who had good connections in the trade and had supplied plaster for the
internal decoration of the Grosvenor Hotel, London, 'the International Exhibition
of 1862, The Adelphi Theatre, the St jarnes' Hall, a great portion of the Royal
Italian Opera House, Covent Garden, and several Mansions and Public Buildings in
England, and on the Continent'. It also stated that Carter and ]acobs would retain a
large financial interest, that Jacobs would be manager and that the buildings and
plant at Orston were new and very extensive:
In immediate contiguity to the Works, there is an almost inexhaustible deposit of the finest
and purest Gypsum rocks ever yet discovered, extending over Nine Acres of Land, which
will yield at least 30,000 tons per acre, lying at such a shallow depth from the surface as to
render the cost of getting them a comparative trifle; there is also upon the upper surface
most valuable beds of Clay, which can be manufactured into bricks and other materials. The
quality of the Clay for bricks has already been tested, the whole of the several buildings
having been erected from bricks manufactured upon the property.
However, the prospectus said little about the likely profitability of the venture.
The demand for the various qualities of Plaster of Paris, Floor Plaster, Alba, Agricultural
Gypsum, and Cement is very extensive, in fact, almost unlimited and after careful investi-
gation, a profit of at least £ 15 per cent upon the capital employed is shown; and it is certain,
from the connection and Trade already secured to the Company, that a dividend of at least
5 per cent will be paid the first year. In addition to the large profits realized from the Plaster,
Gypsum, and Cement, a further considerable profit will accrue by working the vast beds of
clay into bricks, drain pipes, &c., &c. The local demand for bricks and drain pipes (more
especially the latter) is very great and combined with the Railway facilities, will ensure large
profits from this branch of the business and a plant, kiln, &c., are already erected and
complete.
28 In terms of Shannon's classifications, it was a small company (£30,000 share capital of which
£15,000 was paid up). Although he does not provide statistics, Shannon implies that a feature of
such promotions was that they were either abortive or did not survivelong after registration.
29 Shannon, 'The first five thousand limited companies'.
30 NAG: DD.H 167121, prospectus.
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As was then customary, in order to establish a credible limited liability company,
promoters were employed or involved in some way. This was primarily a London
activity and was usually undertaken by solicitors, or members of the emerging
accountancy profession, acting as financial agents." Solicitors were also required to
prepare a company's memorandum, articles and other documents required for
registration, and the use of a London-based firm made company incorporation
much easier. In this case two solicitors, Henry Smith of Westminster and William
Newton of Newark were employed.V A common technique, verging on decep-
tion, was the use of the names of well-known personages to give credence to the
venturer':' Here the proposed directors comprised James Carter and five other
notables. They were the local MP Colonel Brownlow Knox; Thomas Godfrey, a
Newark banker; G. E. Walker, a Nottingham gentleman; and C. E. Newcomen
and A. Moseley, both London barristers.i" They were each given 600 shares in the
company to qualify them as directors if it was successfully floated within one year.
Additionally, the two solicitors, Newton and Smith, were each given 700 shares,
but they were not to be directors. The company's brokers were to be Carter & Son,
the Nottingham firm of one of the vendors.
Public enthusiasm for limited liability joint-stock companies was near its cyclical
peak when the prospectus was published." Although slightly confused between the
new limited liability company and older joint-stock unlimited companies, the local
paper, the Newark Advertiser (subsequently referred to as NA) nevertheless captured
the spirit of the time. One week after the publication of the prospectus, it com-
mented on the establishment ofVoBNPCM:
Joint Stock Enterprise is most certainly one of the havens of the nineteenth century's
progress and prosperity, and it has a tendency to destroy monopolies, and pare down
inordinate profits, it promotes the public interests in more ways than one. The increasing
demand for Plaster of Paris and other preparations EJUSDEM GENERIS and the positive
certainty of a market for all that can be produced, takes the company out of speculation and
makes it a bona fide business undertaking. 36
Despite the prospectus being published at an auspicious time, acceptably pre-
sented, receiving good local publicity'? and appearing in the London financial
31 SeeJ. Armstrong, 'The riseandfall of the company promoterand the financing of British industry',
in J. F. Van Helton, Capitalism in a Mature Economy (Aldershot, r990); and Cottrell, Industrial
Finance, p. 145.
32 NAG: DD.H r67/2o.
33 L. W. Hein, The British Companies Acts and the Practice of Accoullfancy 1844-1962 (New York,
r978), p. 276.
34 The use of lawyers in this way as 'midwives' was quite common; see Cottrell, Industrial Finance,
P·91.
3S Seefootnotes 3 and4.
36 NA (r6 Aug. r865).
37 NA (2 Aug. r865).
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papers.i" VoBNPCM failed to attract sufficient subscriptions. Unfortunately, the
construction of the works was already proceeding, and Carter and Jacobs were
committed to the venture. The official opening at Orston took place on 3 April
1866. The NA recorded that:
This took the form of a dinner to which a number of the principal inhabitants of the place,
the workmen in the employ of the firm, and several private friends sat down ... The whole
village was astir and the bells rung a merry peal in honour of the occasion.:"
Possibly Carter andjacobs thought that such an opening and its resulting favourable
publicity would have been a useful prelude to a renewed appeal to the public for
funds. If so, their hopes were finally dashed by the failure just one month later of
Overend, Gurney & Co. Ltd with its associated bad publicity and loss of public
confidence in limited liability promotions.I" In these circumstances, funds had to be
raised in another way. This eventually took the form of a limited liability company,
as before, but the financial capital contributed was less and drawn from fewer
individuals. The intention was to establish effectively a more modest private com-
pany,41 and raise the remaining funds later as the firm's reputation and financial
success became known.
The Vale of Be1voir and Newark Plaster Co. Ltd (subsequently referred to as
VoBNP) was formed in March 1867. Its purpose was precisely that of its conceived,
but abortive, predecessor: to take over Jacobs's Newark business and the much
larger developing business of Carter and Jacobs at Orston. Its funds were meagre,
being only contributed by the originators, Carter and Jacobs, the owner of a vital
lease, James Hobson, and William Newton, the Newark solicitor, who had been
persuaded to put up money for the venture in the meantime. The company had an
authorised nominal capital of £10,000, with 900 £10 shares issued at par and fully
paid. Carter's contribution was valued at £3,000, for which he and his family were
allocated 300 £10 shares. jacobs's contribution was also valued at £3,000 and for
which he was to be paid £ 1,000 in cash together with being allocated 200 shares.
He was also to have a salary as manager of£350 p.a. 'with an increase so long as the
company pays £15 per cent'." It was further agreed that William Newton, who
had financed the building of the works at Orston until then by way of mortgage,
would provide further advances and act as a surety to the firm's bankers,
Nottingham & Nottinghamshire Banking Co. For this, he was to be given an equity
interest of £3,500 - 350 £10 shares - while his £4,000 loan on mortgage was to
continue. Finally, James Hobson, the Newark manager of Nottingham & Notts.
38 NAG: DD.H [67 / 10- 16.
39 NA (11 Apr. 1866).
40 Also interest rates had been rising since autumn 1865, and S0111e banks and railway contractors had
been failing since the beginning of 1866.
41 Compared with a public company, which had been their intention for VoBNPCM, although there
was as yet no legal distinction between public and private limited companies.
42 NAG: DD.H 167 / 46.
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Banking Co., was granted 50 shares in return for the use of a small field at Orston.
In total, therefore, 900 shares were issued at £ro each, which, together with the
loan from Newton secured by mortgage on freehold land at Orston of £4,000,
provided funds of£13,000. This enabled VoBNP to buy the Trent Works, Newark,
from Jacobs for £3,000; and acquire the Orston freehold land, along with its
buildings, machinery and plant together with the sinking of a well and the opening
of the pits, amounting to £9,500 in total. The new funds also paid for the Orston
leasehold land, engine pumps, plant and the opening of the pits there, which
amounted to £500 in total. The 'five notables', originally proposed as directors of
VoBNPCM to help promote it, did not reappear either as directors of, or investors
in, VoBNP.
For a while it seemed that VoBNP would be successful. It quickly expanded and
took over another Newark firm in February 1868 - Stacker & Bell - plaster
manufacturers who had been threatened with closure. This purchase was financed
by issuing 350 more shares to the partners in Hardy & Co., Grantham, bankers and
owners of part of the Newark freehold land. Although from that point VoBNP
experienced difficulties in raising funds, Hardy & Co. made every effort to support
it,43 in sharp contrast to the negative attitude displayed by Nottingham & Notts.
Banking CO.,44 VoBNP's original bankers.
The company's lack of working and long-term capital was finally recognised by
its directors in early 1870. After an investigation of the financial position by Newton
(because the books were in an unfinished and incomplete state), it was found that
current debts exceeded debtors by £5,941. This was soon resolved. On 17 March
1870 VoBNP issued debentures amounting to £2,941, which were given to Hardy
& Co. (£1,442), Newton (£1,000), Carter (£150) and Jacobs (£349) in place of
the debts owing to them. This issue of debentures was unusual and ahead of its
time,45 and was only made after advice from counsel as to its legality.l" Additionally,
£3,000 of promissory notes were issued, personally guaranteed by the new deben-
ture holders, to other creditors, including £2,200 to Nottingham & Notts. Banking
CO.,47 VoBNP's former bankers.
Despite these difficulties, and in the hope that some backers would emerge, or
that it could be sold as a going concern, VoBNP struggled on until 1873. However,
its finances had so deteriorated by then that there was little alternative to liquidation.
On 12 May 1873 it was unanimously resolved that VoBNP be voluntarily wound
up. Hardy & Co. bought the business and ran it as the Vale of Bel voir and Newark
Plaster Co. at Newark until about 1897.48 They then sold it to R. P. Almond, its
general manager, who ran it until 1920 when it finally closed.
43 NAG: DD.H 167/1 35.
44 NAG: DD.H 167lr39.
45 Cottrell, Industrial Finance, p. 86.
46 NAG: DD.H 167lr27.
47 NAG: DD.H 167/46, p. 41.
48 For an account of VoBNP's activities around 1887, see Royal Album of Arts and Industries '!fGreat
Britain (London, 1887), pp. 407-14.
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Table 1. Vale ofBe/voir and Newark Plaster Co. at liquidation
Liabilities
Estimated liquidation expenses
Mortgage
Debentures
Trade creditors
£4,000
£5,972
£4,506
Assets
Proceeds at auction:
Ortson
Trent Works, Newark
Trade debtors
(Estimated deficit
£6,500
£5 IO
£786
£7,432)
£15,228
Source: Nottinghamshire Archives Office: DD.H 167lr65.
II
It is interesting that, despite not being financially viable from the beginning, YoB
existed in various guises for over 50 years. Why attempt to preserve it for so long?
Victorian England worshipped success and vilified failure. 49 Not only were new
industrial opportunities being recognised, expectations were high. Failure could
hardly be contemplated and, if a company started making losses, its directors tended
to hang on, hoping that things might improve. Thus, when forced into liquidation,
a limited liability company usually had sizeable liabilities (relative to its assets).50
Clearly, this was the case with VoBNP. Whilst it continued, there was the possibil-
ity of raising the necessary long-term finance and, more importantly, of selling the
business as a going concern. Probably this explains why, despite its lack of finance,
VoBNP paid two dividends. The first was in March 1868, made as a result of the
1867 trading profit of £79 I 125 I d. It amounted to ten per cent, involving a total
cost of £784 I45 zd, and was distributed £284 145 zd in cash and £500 by way of
£ IQ shares. A second dividend, also of ten per cent, was paid for 1868. The directors
could not have believed that they could justify these payments on the results that
had been achieved, but they had to give the impression that the firm was doing well.
As a measure of how long its directors did hold on before liquidation, when the
VoBNP was finally wound up in 1873, it had a deficit of £7,432 and debts of more
than double the realised value of its assets. Although the liquidator's final accounts
do not survive, the situation at the commencement of liquidation and a list of the
final shareholders are recorded. 51 These indicate that Newton's original mortgage
and the later debentures secured by way of mortgage would be partially repaid, but
that trade creditors and shareholders would receive nothing. The estimated position
at the time ofliquidation is shown in Table I.
49 W. Houghton, The Victorian Frame ofMind (New Haven, 1957), PP.191-4.
50 G. Todd, 'Some aspects ofjoint stock companies, 1844-1900', Economic History Review, 3 (1932).
51 NAG: DD.H 167lr65.
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The final shareholders comprised the partners in Hardy & Co., James Carter and
his family, William Jacobs, James Hobson and five other individual small share-
holders who had each acquired their holdings fromJacobs when he had disposed of
most of his shares. The liquidation was conducted by a Newark accountant, Thomas
John Caparn. He was to 'continue to carry on the business heretofore ... under the
direction of the committee herein after named until he is enabled satisfactorily to
dispose of same', and that John Hardy, William Newton and James Carter be
members of the committee.Y Later that year, on 16 October, Hardy & Co. bought
the works at Newark and Orston as separate lots at auction for £7,010. (James
Carter & Son were the auctioneers.)
Dissolutions were then often fraudulent, involving collusion between the officers
or managers of the company and the Iiquidator.i" and these frequently involved
newly formed companies. Shannon generalises to the effect that fraudulent compan-
ies were often short-lived and more honest companies long-lived. He quotes a
judge, who casually remarked in 1876 that he had 'the usual contest' in his chambers
as to who should be the official liquidator, and another, who declared in 1879 that
'I have on the suggestion of my chief clerks ... directed them in no case whatever
to appoint any official of the company liquidator. They are always under some
improper influences'. 54 In the case of the VoBNP, this was clearly not the case as
Hardy & Co. were the main shareholders.
Hardy & Co.'s long-continued support for VoBNP provides a remarkable illus-
tration of the unflinching commitment of a local bank to financing an ambitious
and risky local enterprise. Their investment in VoBNP at the time of its dissolution
was about two per cent of the bank's total advances and investments. 55 Even more
astonishing was their unlimited financial support as VoBNP continued to lose
money until at least 1897, when partners in Hardy & Co. finally sold it. This
coincided with the sale of their bank to Leicestershire Banking Co. Ltd and shows
the size of its losses. When clearing the books of account for the take-over, partners
in Hardy & Co. wrote off losses of £20,000 for VoBNP against their capital
accounts of £90,000.56 No doubt absorption sooner or later was inevitable, given
the length of the agricultural depression and the severity of it in the East Midlands.V
Nevertheless, this commitment to YoB must stand in remarkable contrast to
the Hardys' otherwise highly successful banking business, founded on financial
common sense, prudence and skill in balancing risk and return.
" NAO: DD.H 167/163.
53 In both Shannon, 'First five thousand limited companies' and 'Limited companies of 1866-1883 '.
54 Shannon, 'Limited companies of 1866-1883'.
55 On I ]ul. 187.1, when VoBNP went into voluntary liquidation, they were owed £715 4s 7d on
current account (NAO: DD.H 167/8 r) plus debentures valued at £1,422 (HSBC Archives, London
[hereafter HSBC]: AF5). These compare with total credit balances (advances, etc.) of£221,926 and
investments of£5 [,412 tor the entire bank (HSBC: AF2/8).
56 HSBC: 3/5.
57 W. F. Crick and]. E. Wadsworth, A Hundred Years ofJoint Stock Banking (London, jrd edn, 1958),
pp. 270 - 1.
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It must have also been thought, at the time anyway, that the reorganisation of
VoBNP's finances in 1870, which effectively resulted in the creation of fresh long-
and medium-term loan capital of £5,941, was sufficient to place it on a firm
financial footing. However, the large losses that were soon incurred ensured that
this would not last. A number of factors combined to wreck VoBNP. The market
for gypsum and clay products had clearly deteriorated and, although there was no
large amount of stockpiling and a strong demand for bricks, prices were undoubt-
edly hit. 5 8 The rising costs of freight made it particularly difficult for the VoBNP as
it was forced to absorb these within its prices.j" The greatest difficulties were in
extraction and production, and related to the failure of the pumping equipment,
resulting in flooding of the gypsum mines at both Orston and Newark. 60 Particularly
annoying for Jacobs, its manager, given his earlier reputation, was the frequency of
complaints from customers over impurities, mainly grit, in his products.i" and the
emerging superiority of the production methods of Cafferata & Co., VoBNP's main
competitors. Although it is not possible to gauge the severity of these difficulties,
the overall picture was that, given the existing prices for gypsum products, VoBNP
could not cover its costs. This remained so whilst, unlike many other firms, it was
dependent upon existing manufacturing methods and had to use the more expensive
underground mining techniques practised at Orston and Newark.
Although the early accounts reported a profit, VoBNP never made profits as they
were then normally understood (see Table 2). Profits for 1867 and 1868 were reported
but from 1869 to the year of its liquidation it was stated that VoBNP made a 10ss.62
Accounts for 1867, 1868 and 1870 contain a number of technical errors of principle
and, if profits had been computed correctly on the inventory method, losses would
have been disclosed for these years as well. 63 Accounts for manufacturing and mining
ventures were usually prepared according to the inventory method, where profit was
the excess of income over all running costs adjusting for the difference between the
valuation of stock, plant, etc., at the beginning and end of the period.?"
58 ]acobs had declared in a letter to a customer on 17 Dec. 1869 that there had been 'a fearful amount
oflosses this year. Never in the whole of my time in the trade have I experienced anything like it'
and thereafter there were urgent pleas to customers to reorder and references to 'the lean trade' and
'the horrid scarcity of money' (NAG: DD.H 167/107).
59 NAG: DD.H 167/107 .
60 NAG: DD.H 167/46 .
61 NAG: DD.H 167/ 107.
62 NAG: DD.H 167/6 5- 7 3.
"3 Although the accounts were prepared in a way that is similar to the inventory method. opening
stock was excluded from the profit calculation. It also contained the amounts due from debtors and
owing to creditors including the bank overdraft. In order for the accounts to balance, the payments
and cash received figures for the year must have been appropriately adjusted. Because the back-up
papers and ledgers no longer survive. it is only possible to speculate as to how this adjustment was
made. Possibly what was stated as cash received during the year plus debtors equalled sales made.
64 It was common for such accounts to be misleading and over-optimistic. They were not, as usually
supposed, conservative and they did not understate profits as a general rule. As there were then no
particular rules or conventions as to how valuations should be made and how capital expenditure
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In 1871 it was realised by VoBNP's directors that the audited accounts were
incorrect in some way. Until then the auditor had been James Hobson. No doubt
he was considered to be eminently suitable because of both his banking expertise
and being a shareholder. The appointment of auditors who were members, but not
officers, ofa company was encouraged by the 1845 Company Clauses Consolidation
Act. However, on 19 October 187 I the directors resolved that'Mr Hardcastle the
accountant provided by Mr Newton be authorised to audit the company's accounts
commencing with the printed balance sheet of the 31 December 1868'.65 It is not
known from where Hardcastle came from or where he practised. As his name does
not appear in the Nottinghamshire or Lincolnshire trade directories and as his fee
was considerable (£roo), he may have come from outside the district, possibly
London.
Hardcastle revised both the way in which profit was calculated and the stock
valuation. Profits to 1871 were re-computed and the assets were valued by an
independent valuer, a Mr Hickling (later to become a partner in Carter and
Hickling, valuers). The effect of this and the drastically reduced valuations by
Hickling was that an adjustment had to be made to the 1871 accounts for accumu-
lated losses of £9,708 165 rod.6 6 These arose from: trading losses during 1870 and
1871 (£4,963 135 Id); a loss in writing down the value ofland, buildings and plant
from £15,123 55 rod to £11,000 (comprising Orston Works £9,000 and Trent
Works, Newark £2,000), amounting to £4,123 55 rod; and, third, an overpayment
of dividends on the 1868 profit of £621 175 i i d. From 1871 the accounts were
'correctly' prepared according to the principles and conventions of the inventory
basis.
Company minutes do not refer to the circumstances that led to the
re-examination. They merely record that Hickling acted as the valuer in place of
Carter & Co. They also do not refer to the circumstances leading to the replacement
of Hobson as auditor, or state that the previous accounts contained errors of prin-
ciple materially affecting the reported profit and whether the firm should continue
to trade.
The realisation in 1871 that all was not right with the accounts raises the question
of the extent to which the directors and their bankers were themselves misled by
them. For example, even if the accounts for 1867 and 1868 were to be believed and
VoBNP was then profitable, actual cash flows were negative.f" Until the events in
187 I and the revision of the accounts, we can only presume that they were misled.
should be recorded, the reported profit was very much determined by the directors and managers.
For example, stocks might be valued at selling price and not marked down by as much as prudence
would allow. This is an example of what Brief termed 'nineteenth century accounting error'. See
R. P. Brief, 'Nineteenth century accounting error', journal of Accounting Research, 14 (1l)65).
65 NAG: DD.H 167/46 .
66 NAG: DD.H 167/65-72.
67 See Table 1 which shows that by the end of 1 869 total overdrafts had reached £2,036.
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Table 2. Projit and loss accounts and balance sheets (rounded to the nearest £)
Profit and loss account 1867 1868 1870
Debits
Opening stock 2,467
Payments (detailed) 5,732 16,335 11,999
Trade creditors I,325 5,120 2,772
Balance 8I5 1,388 1,371
7,872 22,843 18,609
Credits
Balance from last year 31 74
Cash received 5,535 14,428 12,173
Trade debtors 1,346 4,070 3,03 6
Stock at various works as per valuation 99 1 4,314 3,326
7,872 22,843 I8,609
Balance sheet
Shares - fully paid 9,000 I3,000 I3,000
Mortgage 4,000 4,000 4,000
Bank account 983
Trade creditors I,325 5,120 2,772
Balance ofP & L 815 1,388 I,37 I
Debentures 5,973
I6, I 23 23,508 27,II6
Purchase of freehold, leasehold, land, buildings, plant, 13,786 15, 124 23,221
business at Newark and amount expended thereon to this
day
Trade debtors I,346 4,070 3,036
Stock on hand 991 4,3 I4 3,326
less: opening stock 2,467
859
I6, I23 23,5 08 27,II6
1,871 1,872 1,873
Debits
Opening stock 3,325 2,098 2,098
Payments (detailed) I I,390 IO,590 2,302
Cash 3I
I4,7 I 5 12,688 4,43 I
Credits
Rents 55
Sales 12, I 12 8,4 28 1,805
Closing stock 2,098 2,098 2,098
Cash 29
Loss 450 2,162 499
14,715 12,688 4,43 I
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Table 2. (Continued)
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Profit and 1055 account
Balance sheet
Shares - fully paid
Mortgage
Creditors
Debentures (and interest)
Unclaimed dividends
13,000
4,000
2,887
6,010
25
25,922
1868 1870
13,000 13,000
4,000 4,000
4, 117 4,432
5,973 5,973
92 3 1
3,024 2,097
2,098 2,098
25,922 27,090
Fixed plant
Accumulated loss to 1871
Loss - 1872
-
1873
Cash
Trade debtors
Stock
11,000
9,70 8
I 1,000
9,708
2, I 56
11,000
9,708
2,156
538
30
1,875
2,098
27,405
Notes:
I The accounts for 1869 have not survived.
2 From 1868 bank loans are included in Creditors.
3 The 1870 accounts include stock debited to profit and loss for the first time and deducted
from the closing stock on the balance sheet.
4 The accumulated loss to 187 I is described on the final balance sheet tor 187 I as
'Extraordinary expenses in baring rocks & pumping flooded mines ere'. In later balance
sheets and the draft profit and loss account for 1871 it is described as a loss.
5 For 1872 and 1873 the opening and closing stocks are at similar valuations.
The accounts were printed - presumably to impress potential investors they still
hoped the VoBNP could attract (Figure I).
There is some evidence to suggest that Jacobs, who was not a director, was not
misled and had limited faith in the business from the beginning. He was the only
person with the necessary experience and, more than anyone else, he must have
recognised the fragility of the assumptions on which the original VoBNPCM
prospectus had been based. It is interesting to observe how he extracted himself
financially as much as possible from the scheme without undermining it. The terms
of the acquisition of his original business were that he was partially paid off (to the
extent of £ I ,000). He was not designated a director of VoBNP, merely the man-
ager. Most significant of all was that he gradually reduced his investment. In
November 1867 he sold ten of his shares for £10 each (i.e. at par) to James Hobson,
an existing shareholder. Shortly afterwards, he sold a further ten shares and in June
1869 25 shares, all for £10 each, their par value. The latter transaction was a
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Figure I. Balance sheet of the Vale of Be/voir and Newark Plaster Co. Lid, 31 December
1870
particularly beneficial deal as the only other share transfer during that year (April
1869) was of 50 shares for 55 in total, reflecting the demise of the firm.
Would YoB have been successful had its formation not coincided with the
Overend, Gurney & Co. Ltd debacle in I8M? Whilst the creation ofVoB was the
result of overwhelming optimism for such ventures brought about by limited
liability, the first attempt to finance VoBNPCM by means of a public prospectus in
1865 undoubtedly failed because of already developing scepticism over the extrava-
gant claims commonly then generally made in prospectuses. There were no guide-
lines for the content of promotional literature and between 1847 and 1867 there
were no statutory controls over prospectuses.
Misleading and fraudulent prospectuses were common.P" Among the factors
which may have deterred potential investors from VoPBNPCM were the claims of
an unlimited demand for gypsum products, that the land at Orston would provide
hR Robb, White Collar Crime, eh. ). In TXf>7 a parliamentary select committee was set up to investigate
this and other matters, Testimony revolved around two things: the factual inaccuracies contained in
prospectuses and the undisclosed arrangements with promoters, underwriters and others to drain off
material amounts ofmoney subscribed by the investors (BPP, 1R67 (329) X, 393, Select Committee
on Limited Liability Acts, Report), Although the committee made no recommendations concerning
either problem, the new Act addressed the second problem, See Hunt, Development or the Business
Corporation, pp, 302-4).
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the company with an overall profit of at least 15 per cent, and the suggestion, based
on 'expert advice', that the estimated reserves were 50 per cent per unit area greater
than any other part of the Vale of Belvoir gypsum workings. The nature of the
advice may also have been questioned since it seemed to rest on a statement by
Robert Lineker, which was addressed to no one, remarkably brief, and lacking any
indication of the evidence on which its conclusions were based (see Appendix).
Lineker was, at face value, well qualified to write an independent assessment. He
had been one of a small group of independent gypsum quarriers and plaster and
brick manufacturers based in Newark during the 1850S and I860s and was not a
competitor. However, he was not one of the most successful. Between 1856 and
1860 he had financial problems that forced him to sell most of his property and, by
1860, his business had closed. 6 9
Subsequent efforts to raise the necessary finance from outside parties were
undoubtedly affected by the unpopularity of limited liability, which was necessary
if they were to help. It should not be thought that the venture was a complete
'white elephant', however, as after Hardy & Co. sold the business in 1894 pro-
duction of both gypsum and bricks continued for another 26 years. Possibly a
change to economic viability occurred around 1894 when VOB was bought out by
its general manager. 70
III
The case of the various VoB companies demonstrates the inadequacies of financial
information, in terms of both annual accounts and prospectuses, required to support
the financial management of the new limited joint-stock companies of the I860s.
By 1865, the necessary standard of financial reporting and the related regulations
were clearly not in place, and wide-ranging types of failure must have been inevi-
table. Whilst the Overend, Gurney & Co. Ltd case, and others, may have been
fraudulent, that of VoB suggests that there must have been many failures arising
from simple naivety. Financial judgement must have been quite a new skill that was
required instantly of many Victorian entrepreneurs and investors with the general
coming oflimited liability that allowed the separation of ownership and control."
69 It is interesting that in Nov. 1859 ajudgement was made against Lineker for a debt of £332 ros to
William Newton. See NAO: DD.H 16719.
70 R. P. Almond, the former general manager, continued to trade under the name ofVoBNP. Under
his management, during which he concentrated on the, hitherto underdeveloped, properties
at Balderton, mid-way between Newark and Orston, the business was apparently successful.
Unfortunately, there are insufficient financial or other archives to analyse meaningfully the firm's
history or the reasons for its survival.
71 M. M. Postan has written: 'A social base to the capital market of the mid-century was provided by
the new class of "pure" investors, the people who had learned to put their money into profitable
use, and to decide that use by the sole criterion of interest and whose expectations of income were
very largely a matter of yields and quotations. It is their activities that imparted to the behaviour of
capital all its characteristics of a perfect capitalist factor of production': 'Recent trends in the
accumulation in capital', Economic History Review, 6 (1935).
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YoB illustrates the errors of judgement that occurred with these newly discovered
opportunities for financing an ambitious enterprise. The drawing-in of Newton and
the partners in Hardy & Co. to support VoBNP contrasts with jacobs's gradual
withdrawal. Whilst the former, along with Carter, were no doubt seduced by the
prospects, prestige and potential of the new limited liability companies, they did not
fully recognise the implications. This contrasts with the gradual withdrawal of
Jacobs, the only individual in this case with a practical understanding and experience
of the realities of gypsum quarrying and manufacture of its products. His practical
in sights and common sense prevented him from being overtaken by the excitement
oflimited liability and allowed him ultimately to profit from the sale of his business.
The case of YoB also illustrates the need for good financial information for the
new limited liability companies. It was required to inform the financial and business
decisions that had to be made by both the 'new class of "pure" investorsm and the
new breed of managers and directors arising from the separation of ownership and
control. It supports the view that standard procedures for calculating profit were
then not in place, with the consequence that major 'errors of principle' at a local
level could be, and were, made.
Appendix
Sir:-
I herewith hand you the enclosed Report of the Plaster Works at Orston which I
have made according to your request.
There is in the large Field seven feet six inches of clay in depth, which can be
made into Bricks and Tiles at the rate of Four Million per Acre. This can be taken
off at Six Pence per Yard which will reduce the price of Stone getting. There is in
the depth ofSixty Feet from the top soil ten beds ofPlaster Stone averaging fourteen
Feet in One Yard from top to bottom of Sixty Feet in depth, that will turn out Six
Tons and a half in One Yard. There are Thirty-two thousand Tons and a Half in
One Acre as near as can be estimated. This can be raised at Five Shillings per Ton,
including all Apparatus, after the First Pit is taken out.
Yr. humble svt. Robt. Lineker. over
In the small Field there are six Beds of White Plaster Stone, which will turn out
Three Tons and a Half in One yard from the top soil to the bottom, of Forty Five
Feet in depth. This can be raised at Four Shillings per Ton or Eleven Pence per yard
including all Apparatus after the First Pit is taken out.
The Quality of the Plaster Stone I find in both fields is as Good as any in the
Neighbourhood of Newark or anywhere else.
72 ibid.
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If it is required to raise the depth of Fifteen Feet only, there would be Two Tons
in One Yard. If the Seven Feet Six Inches depth of Clay could be manufactured
into Bricks and Tiles in the Large Field, the Clay could be taken off at Six Pence
per Yard; the Seven Feet Six Inches of Plaster and Clay Mad could be raised and
turned over at the cost of Two Shillings per Ton to the mouth of the Pit.
Yr. humble svt. Robt. Lineker.
